Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947-2004
## Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<td>Central Command (U.S.)</td>
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<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)</td>
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<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter Services Intelligence</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of the Islamic Conference</td>
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<td>POWs</td>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asia Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>TIFA</td>
<td>Trade and Investment Framework Agreement</td>
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<td>U.S.A</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USMAAG</td>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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Pakistan's Foreign Policy: an Overview, a briefing paper by PILDAT, is a special presentation in the context of the PILDAT Short Course for Parliamentarians and Politicians on The Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan. Developed by PILDAT, as a part of the Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Consortium - PLSC, supported financially by the USAID, the paper looks at the major foreign policy phases and development of perspectives in the foreign policy of Pakistan. The paper has been especially commissioned by PILDAT to provide a comprehensive overview of Pakistan's foreign policy from 1947-2004. The briefing paper, essentially prepared for parliamentarians, can also serve as a stand-alone reference document on the foreign policy of Pakistan to-date.

Authoring by the renowned defence and political analyst, Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, the paper attempts to present an objective and factual commentary, covering accurate history and shaping of foreign policy perspectives. PILDAT strongly feels that foreign policy should be reviewed and influenced by the supreme policy-making institution of the country: Parliament. It is in this perspective that PILDAT bids to provide an objective and comprehensive overview of the Pakistani foreign policy since independence so as to orient parliamentarians towards the dynamics, actors and influencing factors on foreign policy.

This briefing paper is a part of the series of the papers and studies PILDAT has compiled on the subject of foreign policy. Another briefing paper covers the spectrum of the process of foreign policy formulation in Pakistan; a previous briefing paper examines the issue of Pakistan-India Relationship in detail, while three separate case studies examine the formulation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy with special reference to Gulf Crisis-1990; Comparison among Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits and the Recognition of Taliban by Pakistan. PILDAT hopes that these papers and the studies, both individually and collectively, serve the purpose of raising awareness of parliamentarians on the dynamics of foreign policy in Pakistan as well as build their capacity to take a pro-active role in formulation, review, analysis and influencing of foreign policy of Pakistan.

The author, PILDAT and its team of researchers have made every effort to ensure the accuracy of the contents of this paper. PILDAT, however, does not accept any responsibility of any omission or error as it is not deliberate.

The views expressed in this paper belong to the author and are not necessarily shared by PILDAT, PLSC or USAID.

Lahore
April 2004
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Pakistan is a major participant in the global efforts to curb transnational terrorism initiated after the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001. This enhanced Pakistan's strategic relevance for the major powers, especially the United States, which cultivated Pakistan for combating terrorism and ensuring peace and stability in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. They also wanted that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda activists, formerly based in Afghanistan, did not create safe havens in Pakistani territory with the support of their Pakistani sympathisers.

Pakistan has not always been so relevant to global politics. Its strategic relevance has varied over time which had implications for Pakistan's role at the international level and the foreign policy options available to its policy makers. This briefing paper examines the changing patterns of Pakistan's foreign policy and how its position and role in international and regional politics has varied over time.

Pakistan recognises that it is neither possible nor advisable to stay in isolation in the present day interdependent and complex international system. It needs to interact with other states, international and regional organisations and supranational actors in order to protect and promote its national interests and sovereign identity. Pakistan also collaborates with other states in order to cope with the issues of global dimensions like environment, population, poverty and underdevelopment, energy, human migrations and refugees, drugs, and terrorism.

Despite pursuing a pro-active foreign policy Pakistan does not have the ambition and capacity to assume the role of a global or regional power. Its activism reflects a realisation that such a policy facilities the mobilisation of International support and resources for its domestic socio-economic development, helps to regulate the inputs from the external environment into the internal context, and contributes to strengthening security and territorial integrity which are the principal concerns of Pakistan's foreign policy.

The major focus of Pakistan's foreign policy is security against external and internal challenges to its national identity, territorial integrity and independence. Another foreign policy interest is the cultivation of close and brotherly relations with the Muslim states. Pakistan highlights sovereign equality of states, bilateralism, mutuality of interests, and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs as the cardinal features of its foreign policy. Pakistan firmly believes that it has to work within the norms and institutions of the international system but it supports their restructuring for brining them in line with the realities currently obtaining in the International system. Pakistan, therefore, maintains a strong faith in the principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter and takes an active part in the deliberations of the UN and other International and regional organisations. Pakistan also identifies with the political and economic concerns of the developing countries. Other leading foreign policy goals include support to the right of self determination for the subjugated nations, oppositions to apartheid and the remnants of colonialism, peaceful resolution of inter-state disputes, arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, and promotion of peace and stability through international and regional cooperation.

The principal strategies and mechanisms to pursue these foreign policy goals have varied over time. These changes help to identify the major phases in Pakistan's foreign policy. Though each phase is characterised by a set of major themes and operational strategies, these overlap and reflect continuity and change.
Major Phases of Pakistan's Foreign Policy

The major phases of Pakistan's foreign policy are:

a. 1947-53: Exploration and friendship with all
b. 1953-62: Alignment with the West
c. 1962-71: Transition
d. 1972-79: Bilateralism and nonalignment
e. 1980-90: Afghanistan and Partnership with the U.S.
f. 1990-2001: Post-Cold War Era and Pakistan's Dilemmas
g. 2001 onwards: Pakistan and Counter Terrorism

a. 1947-53: Exploration and Friendship with All

Foundations of the Foreign Policy

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and its first Governor-General, gave two special talks on radio to introduce Pakistan to the people of the United States and Australia. He expressed a strong desire to develop friendly ties with other states on the eve of his meeting with the special representative of the King of Afghanistan in December 1947. Similar views were expressed when the first ambassadors of Burma (January 1948), France (January 1948), the United States (February 1948), Turkey (March 1948) and Afghanistan (May 1948) presented their credentials. Outlining the goals of foreign policy, Jinnah declared:

“Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair-play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world, and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.”

Pakistan joined the United Nations on September 30 1947, as a new member and stayed in the Commonwealth. Its leadership established contacts with other states, emphasising friendship with all, promotion of peace and harmony, support for liberation of the colonised people, and a strict observance of the principles of international conduct as enshrined in the UN Charter.

Relations with India

The early years of independence were dominated by Pakistan's problems with India on the one hand, and the efforts to introduce the new state to the world community on the other. The problems it developed with India in the immediate aftermath of independence left an indelible impact on its foreign policy and built hostility and distrust into Pakistan-India relations. Most of these problems were the product of the partition process, as set out in the 3rd June 1947 Plan and the Indian Independence Act, July 1947. These included, inter alia, the division of the funds and other assets of the British Indian government, including arms, equipment and stores of the British Indian military; the large scale killing of people at the time of independence and the subsequent communal riots; the religious minorities in the two states; the disposal of evacuee property; the river-water dispute; and bilateral trade. These disputes were coupled with controversies about the accession of the princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Jammu and Kashmir, and the outbreak of the first Kashmir war (1947-48). The ill-will generated by these problems was reinforced by the concentration of Indian troops on the border in the Punjab in 1950-51, when an armed conflict was narrowly averted. On top of this were the statements of a number of Indian leaders, including those belonging to the ruling Congress party, regretting the establishment of Pakistan; some even talked about the reunification of India and Pakistan.

What compounded Pakistan’s security concerns were Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistani territory. Refusing to recognise Pakistan's sovereignty over North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, the Afghanistan government made divergent claims on these provinces, which ranged from a demand for the right of self determination for Pushtuns/Pathans living in Pakistan and establishment of an independent state comprising NWFP and Baluchistan, to the incorporation of parts of these provinces into Afghanistan. India endorsed Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistan, and, in the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union extended a similar support to Afghanistan in
retaliation to Pakistan's participation in U.S. sponsored defence pacts. Pakistan's policy makers felt threatened by the spectre of Soviet backed Indo-Afghan military pressure, if not a full-fledged attack on its western and eastern borders. The security against such potential threats emerged as the cardinal concern of Pakistan.

Security Imperatives
The security imperatives led the policy makers to pay special attention to the reorganisation of the armed forces that Pakistan inherited after the division of the British Indian military. Almost all units of the armed forces were re-grouped and a new organizational and administrative network had to be created for them. Pakistan purchased some weapons and military equipment from a number of Western states for modernization of the three services of the armed forces. British officers were retained and some Pakistani officers were sent to Great Britain and other Commonwealth states for training. However, the pace of modernization was rather slow until Pakistan joined the West-sponsored security pacts in 1954-55.

Relations with U.S.A. and USSR
Pakistan started with an independent foreign policy and cultivated relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The United States felicitated the establishment of Pakistan and the ambassadorial level relations were resumed in February 1948. The Soviet attitude towards the establishment of Pakistan was indifferent. Though Pakistan and the Soviet Union agreed to establish diplomatic relations in April 1948, it was not until December 1949 that Pakistan's first ambassador resumed his assignment in Moscow. The Soviet ambassador took up his position in Karachi in March 1950. Pakistan was the first Muslim country to recognise the People's Republic of China in the first week of January 1950. The ambassadors of China and Pakistan presented their credentials in September and November 1951 respectively.

An opportunity to change Soviet indifference knocked in June 1949, when the Soviet Union invited Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, for an official visit. The invitation was accepted but the visit did not materialise. Instead, Liaquat Ali Khan visited the United States in May 1950, and his speeches and statements during this visit manifested a strong pro-West disposition of the Pakistan government. The Soviet leadership was unhappy over Liaquat Ali Khan's decision not to visit the Soviet Union.

Relations with Muslim Countries
Pakistan attached importance to its relations with the Muslim countries. It actively championed the cause of the Muslims all over the world and worked towards promoting harmony and cooperation amongst the Muslim states. It sponsored several unofficial conferences for cultivating a broad-based consensus on setting up an organisation representing all Muslim states. The leaders of most Muslim states did not show interest in establishing an international forum of the Muslim states. Some Muslim states ignored Pakistan's initiative; others extended a cautious approval; still others did not favour the idea. Indonesia and Egypt had strong reservations about Pakistan's efforts to promote unity in the Muslim world. Afghanistan was also not prepared to endorse Pakistan's efforts. Pakistani leadership was disappointed by the response of the Muslim leaders. Pakistan was, however, able to cultivate very cordial relations with Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. With other Muslim relations, Pakistan's relations could be described as a routine relationship.
b. 1953-62: Alignment with the West

Alignment with the West
The second phase of Pakistan's foreign policy was characterised by a transition from an independent foreign policy to a multifaceted alignment with the West. Pakistan entered into a number of security arrangements with the United States and obtained economic and military assistance from that source which entangled Pakistan in the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Pakistan's alignment policy was shaped primarily by its acute sense of insecurity within the regional context. Pakistan's security problems primarily with India and secondarily with Afghanistan were catalyst to Pakistan's frantic search for allies. The deepening economic crisis in the early 1950s also contributed to this decision. In early 1952, the prices of jute and cotton began to drop in the International market which adversely affected Pakistan's foreign trade. The foreign exchange earnings and gold and sterling reserves dwindled. Pakistan was also faced with a serious shortage of wheat in 1952-53. The United States came for Pakistan's rescue by offering a gift of wheat in 1953 which helped to overcome food shortages and built a lot of goodwill in Pakistan for the donor.

Several other factors pushed Pakistan towards alignment with the United States. Pakistan suffered from a sense of isolation in the World. The efforts to promote unity in the Muslim World were not making headway. It also became clear that the UN and the Commonwealth would not facilitate the solution of the Pakistan-India problems, especially the Kashmir dispute.

The choice of the United States was not surprising. Apart from the U.S. willingness to offer assistance as a part of its global strategy for the containment of Communism, Pakistan leaders had already given ample evidence of their pro-West disposition. Their distrust of the Soviet Union was quite known which was reinforced by the unearthing of a pro-Soviet 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy' (1951) to dislodge the government in Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan's successors were politically weak and they thought that American economic and military aid would reinforce their position in the body politic.

The top-brass of the military made a significant contribution towards building Pakistan-U.S. relationship. They put their weight in favour of the United States because, in their opinion, the West was more advanced in economic and technical fields and that the West had sufficient resources and determination to support its allies.

Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement
In February 1954, Pakistan agreed on the U.S. initiative to develop close cooperation with Turkey in the political, economic and cultural spheres. A formal Turkey-Pakistan Agreement was signed in April 1954, followed by a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between the United States and Pakistan in May. The United States agreed to provide military equipment, training facilities and other related services to enable Pakistan to maintain "its international security, its legitimate self-defence or to permit it to participate in the defence of a area or in the United Nations collective security arrangements and measures." Pakistan was obliged not to use the assistance provided under this agreement for undertaking "any act of aggression against any other nation." It could not use this assistance for purposes other than those specified in the agreement.

SEATO
In September 1954, Pakistan joined the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) or the Manila Pact. Its members (Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and the U.S.) undertook to develop capacity "to resist attack and counter subversive activities" and promote cooperation for "economic progress and social well being." They pledged that an armed aggression or threat to territorial integrity of a member state would be considered a threat to all, and that they would consult each other in order to meet such a challenge. The United States made it clear that the SEATO pledge applied only to communist aggression or subversion. Pakistan's plea to include all kinds of aggression was not accepted.

The Baghdad Pact/CENTO
One year later (September 1955) Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact (renamed CENTO in 1959 after Iraq's withdrawal). Pakistan attached greater importance to this pact because it involved three Muslim states, i.e. Iraq (up to 1959), Turkey and Iran. Great Britain was also its member; the United States maintained close links with it and participated in its military committee. The members of the Baghdad Pact agreed to cooperate with each other in the field of defence and security. The United States made it clear
that its participation in the military committee and assistance for strengthening the defensive capability of the member states pertained “solely to communist menace and [carried] no connotations with respect to intra-area matters.”

Defence and Economic Assistance from the U.S.A.
A Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation was signed between Pakistan and the United States in March 1959, as an executive understanding. Its preamble declared that the United States regarded “as vital to its national interest and to world peace, the preservation of independence and integrity of Pakistan.” Article 2 of the Agreement provided that the United States would supply military and economic assistance to Pakistan as may be mutually agreed upon “in order to assist the government of Pakistan in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic development.” Pakistan reciprocated by providing a communication/air base to the United States at Badaber, near Peshawar, for ten years: 1959-69.

Pakistan's alignment with the United States yielded several advantages. American economic assistance grants, loans, goods and services gave a boost to Pakistan's faltering economy. The most significant contribution was in the field of defence and security where the two states developed very close ties. Pakistan received grant assistance valued at US $ 650 million, and credit facilities worth US $ 55 million. The military assistance included arms and ammunition, artillery pieces, APCs, and transport for the Army; aircraft F-104, B-57, F-86, and C-130 for the Air Force; naval defence equipment, including warships; radar and communication equipment. The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG) was set up in Pakistan to advise and guide the modernisation of the armed forces and the security arrangements. A number of divisions were reequipped, and a few new ones were raised, coupled with the restructuring of the defence system. Training facilities in Pakistan were improved and a good number of Pakistan military officers were sent to the United States on different training courses; Pakistan's Air Force and the Navy took part in joint CENTO exercises which enabled them to gain invaluable experience.

Cost of Alignment with the West
The alignment with the West was not cost-free. Pakistan's independent foreign policy was compromised and the prospects for improvement of its relations with the Soviet Union suffered heavily. The Soviet leaders were extremely perturbed by this development and they resorted to a two-pronged strategy against Pakistan. First, the Soviet leaders made a blistering criticism of Pakistan's alignment with the U.S. and threatened Pakistan with dire consequences if Pakistan allowed its territory to be used against the Soviet Union. Second, they extended support to India on the Kashmir question, describing it an integral part of India. They also supported Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistani territory.

Pakistan's participation in defence pacts came in conflict with its desire to cultivate close and cordial relations with the Muslim states. With the exception of Iran and Turkey which shared the defence arrangements, the Middle Eastern states responded negatively to Pakistan's security ties with the West.

Pakistan also lost ground with the developing countries. Pakistan was very active in organising the Bandung Conference in 1955 but, when the spirit of Bandung crystallised into the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, Pakistan was excluded because of its participation in defence pacts. Earlier, it adopted an ambiguous policy towards the Suez crisis, 1956, which alienated Egypt. It kept its relations with the socialist-communist countries at a low-level in order to strengthen its credentials as a Western ally.

Despite Pakistan's respect for the U.S. security sensitivities, the latter was not prepared to extend enough diplomatic support to Pakistan in its problems with India. This raised doubts in Pakistan about the credibility of American support. If Pakistanis were sceptical of American commitment, questions were raised in the United States as early as 1957 about the advisability of relying on Pakistan as a defender of American interest vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. However, the two sides played down their difference and continued to cooperate with each other for different reasons.

Relations with China
China avoided an open condemnation of Pakistan's participation in these pacts and showed a remarkable understanding of the factors that led Pakistan to join the Western camp. However, Pakistan maintained a safe distance from China and its policy on the seating of China in the UN waivered; it was more in line with the U.S. Perspective.
1962-71: Transition

Rethinking about the Alignment Policy
Pakistan's policy-makers began a review of their alignment with the U.S. in the early 60s as strains manifested in their relations. Two major developments contributed to this. First, Pakistan was perturbed by the Soviet threat of retaliation when it downed an American spy plane, U-2, which had taken off from Badaber. Second, the importance of land bases declined because the United States developed ICBM and nuclear submarines fitted with missiles. Furthermore, the Kennedy administration, installed in January 1961, cultivated India and projected it as a counterweight to China. Pakistan viewed this shift in American policy with concern. In July, 1961, President Ayub Khan, on a visit to the United States, cautioned his hosts against the changes in their policy towards South Asia and highlighted the importance of Pakistan by suggesting that “if there is real trouble, there is no other country in Asia on whom you will be able to count. The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan, provided you are also prepared to stand by them.”

Despite Ayub Khan's pleadings, the U.S. continued with its policy of cultivating India in total disregard to Pakistan's concerns. The U.S. and a number of other Western states rushed weapons and military equipment to India after the Sino-Indian border war in October 1962. They also conducted joint military exercises with India and offered a nuclear umbrella to India. Pakistan was perturbed by these developments. What baffled the Pakistani leaders most was that Pakistan was supplied military equipment in the 50s only after it joined the U.S. sponsored military pacts which incurred diplomatic cost for Pakistan in terms of its relations with the developing countries and a number of Muslim states. However, India was not asked to make any security-related commitment in return for arms transfers.

Improving Relations with the Soviet Union
Disappointed by the change in the U.S. policy, the Pakistani leaders decided to review Pakistan’s alignment with the West. Initially, they decided to diversify their interaction in the international system by improving ties with the socialist countries on mutually beneficial considerations. Pakistan took a number of steps to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and China during 1961-63. Pakistan and the Soviet Union entered into a number of agreements for economic and technical cooperation. In 1961, the Soviets offered, for the first time, credit and technical assistance for oil exploration in Pakistan. New avenues of cooperation were explored during the visits of Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and President Ayub Khan to Moscow in January and April 1965 respectively. Ayub Khan was the first head of Pakistani state to visit the Soviet Union. His visit produced several agreements covering trade, machinery for oil exploration, and cultural exchanges. The Soviet Union consented to assist Pakistan in implementing 30 development projects during the Third Five Year Plan (1965-70).

By mid-1960s the Soviet Union adopted a balanced approach towards Pakistan-India disputes, including the Kashmir problem, and urged the two sides to settle their problems amicably. They maintained neutrality towards the Rann of Kutch war between Pakistan and India in April 1965. A similar attitude was adopted when a full-fledged war broke out between Pakistan and India in September. The Soviet Prime Minister, Alexi Kosygin, offered help to resolve the problems arising out of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri met in Tashkent in January 1966 on the invitation of the Soviet Prime Minister and signed a peace agreement, commonly known as the Tashkent Declaration of January 1966 for normalisation of their bilateral relations in the aftermath of the 1965 war.

Ayub Khan undertook his third visit to the Soviet Union in October 1967, and the Soviet Premier, Alexi Kosygin, visited Pakistan in April 1968 and May 1969. They affirmed their desire to extend cooperation between the two countries in economic, cultural, and other fields. Two Pakistani military delegations visited the Soviet Union in June 1966 and July 1968 and the Soviets supplied some weapons and transport in 1968-70. The Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechkov, visited Pakistan in March 1969 which underlined the transformed nature of Pakistan-Soviet relations.

Improving Relations with China
Pakistan's relations with China improved more rapidly during the same period. They signed several agreements in 1963 to expand their bilateral relations. These included an agreement on trade, commerce and shipping in January 1963, a border agreement for demarcation of Pakistan-China boundary in March 1963, an air services agreement in August, and a barter trade agreement in September.
Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) resumed its regular air service to China on April 29, 1964. A similar air service was started for Moscow in the same month.

Pakistan began to plead for the seating for China in the UN and supported China in its efforts to neutralise American efforts to isolate it at the international level. Chinese were equally supportive of Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity.

Zhou Enlai declared Chinese support to the right of self determination for the people of Kashmir during his visit to Pakistan in February 1964. They reaffirmed their solidarity with Pakistan during Ayub Khan's visit to Beijing in March 1965, and stood by Pakistan during the latter's war with India, first in the Rann of Kutch area (April-May 1965), and then the full-fledged armed conflict (September 1965). They also began to supply weapons and military equipment to Pakistan in early 1966.

The scope of Pakistan-China cooperation continued to extend in the diplomatic, economic (including trade), security, and cultural fields in the subsequent years. The visits of Chinese President Liu Chao Chi, and Foreign Minister, Chen Yi (March 1966), Zhou Enlai (stopover visit in June 1966), President Yahya Khan (November 1970) and several senior military officers, showed that they attached importance to their bilateral relations, and consulted each other regularly on matters of mutual interest.

**Diminishing Ties with the U.S.**

The United States was unhappy over Pakistan's efforts to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and China. The United States described the Sino-Pakistan air agreement as "an unfortunate breach of the free world solidarity." It advised Pakistan not to invite Zhou EnLai for an official visit in 1964. Pakistan did not listen to the U.S. advice. The latter retaliated by withdrawing the offer of financial assistance for the construction of a new airport at Dhaka; Ayub Khan's schedule visit to the U.S in April 1965 was postponed. The same happened with the meeting of the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium which was to consider Pakistan's request for aid for the Third Five Year Plan.

The divergence between the two states widened as Pakistan was unable to invoke any security arrangement with the United States during the course of its war with India in September 1965. The United States imposed an arms embargo on South Asia which adversely affected Pakistan's combat effectiveness because, unlike India, Pakistan's defence procurement was almost entirely American. The embargo was partly eased in March 1966 to allow the sale of non-lethal military equipment (i.e. trucks, medical and engineering supplies and communication items). One year later, the United States allowed the sale of spare parts for the military equipment supplied in the past. No new combat equipment was allowed to be sold to either country but Pakistan was provided with some arms and equipment during 1970-71 as a 'special one time exception' extended by President Nixon. A total embargo was re-imposed when a new war broke out between Pakistan and India in November 1971.

Pakistan procured weapons and military equipment from several non-American sources. China was the most important source of supply of weapons in the post-1965 war period. Some equipment was secured through Iran and Turkey. It also secured weapons from France, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. Pakistan also decided to pay more attention to indigenous production of weapons and defence equipment.

**Pluralistic Perspective**

Pakistan, thus, moved away from the policy of alignment with the West to an independent and pluralist perspective on foreign relations. It vowed to cultivate mutually advantageous bilateral relations with all states irrespective of their ideological disposition and argued that its interaction with one state would neither influence its relations with any other state nor were these ties directed against any particular state.

Thus, while expanding its relations with the Soviet Union and China, it did not abandon its membership of the U.S. sponsored pacts, although their importance was downgraded. It was Pakistan's determination to pursue an independent foreign policy that it did not endorse Asian Collective Security System advocated by the Soviet Union in 1969. This proposal envisaged the establishment of a Soviet-oriented collectivity of states in the backdrop of the widening rift between the Soviet Union and China. Pakistan, having developed distaste for bloc politics, could not be inclined towards this proposal. Moreover, Pakistan had cultivated very friendly and cordial relations with China and it did not want to be a party to any political networking directly or indirectly aimed at China.
Relations with India
Pakistan's relations with India continued to be characterised by the conflicting national aspirations and mutual distrust. The Kashmir problem was the major stumbling block in the normalisation of their relations. Six rounds of talks were held between the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan on Kashmir during December 1962 and May 1963 on the initiative of the UK and the U.S. These talks proved inconclusive because the two sides refused to show any flexibility in their positions on Kashmir.

Pakistan and India engaged in three wars during this period. The first war was limited to the Rann of Kutch, an area situated on the Sindh-Gujarat border, in April-May 1965. This was followed by a full-blown war in September 1965, involving three services of the armed forces. India and Pakistan again went to war against the backdrop of the civil strife in the then East Pakistan in November-December 1971. This war came to an end when Pakistani troops surrendered to Indian troops in East Pakistan on 16 December 1971. East Pakistan emerged as an independent state of Bangladesh.

Crisis in East Pakistan and International Response
The Soviets were disappointed by Pakistan's response to the Asian Collective Security Plan which brought about a degree of restraint in their interaction with Pakistan. They did not, therefore, hesitate to send a terse letter to President Yahya Khan after Pakistan embarked on military action in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) on March 25, 1971. The Soviets were also perturbed by Pakistan's role in bringing about Sino-American rapprochement in July 1971 which set the stage for U.S. President Nixon's visit to Beijing in February 1972. The Soviets perceived this as the beginning of a Sino-American understanding to their detriment. Since Pakistan was instrumental to the establishment of these ties, the Soviets decided to fall back on India to pressure Pakistan. The Soviet foreign Minister visited New Delhi in August 1971 and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which encouraged India to adopt a more strident policy towards the civil strife in East Pakistan. India invoked Article 9 of this treaty in October to secure concrete Soviet support for its policy on the East Pakistan (Bangladesh) crisis. The Soviets not only extended diplomatic support but also airlifted arms and equipment to strengthen India's interventionary policies in East Pakistan and its invasion in November 1971. Accusing Pakistan of resorting to aggression against India, the Soviet Union exercised veto power thrice in the UN Security Council on December 5, 6, and 13, 1971, to stall a ceasefire resolution, which gave India enough time to overrun East Pakistan.

The United States and China did not endorse Pakistan's military action in East Pakistan but they avoided any public criticism of Pakistan's policies. Expressing support for the territorial integrity of Pakistan, the United States endeavoured to encourage Pakistan to seek a political solution to the Bangladesh crisis. Similarly, China extended strong diplomatic support to Pakistan but advised for a political settlement of the problem.
d. 1972-79: Bilateralism and Nonalignment

The independent approach to world affairs initiated in the mid-1960s shaped up into a policy of bilateralism and nonalignment during this phase. The mutuality of interests rather than permanent alignment was the main criterion for cultivating relations with the U.S., the Soviet Union and China. It was not a policy of equidistance from these states but emphasised mutuality of interests at the bilateral level without alienating one for the sake of the other.

Pakistan withdrew from the Commonwealth and the SEATO in January and November 1972 respectively. It may be pointed out here that Pakistan returned to the Commonwealth in September 1989. Pakistan recognised the Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea), Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and East Germany in November 1972.

Pakistan diversified interaction by giving more attention to developing economic, trade and diplomatic relations with the states of Eastern Europe, especially Yugoslavia and Rumania. Similar interaction was cultivated with several states in Asia, Africa and South and Central America, hitherto neglected by Pakistan's policy makers.

An important offshoot of independent and non-aligned foreign policy was Pakistan's greater identification with the causes and issues of the developing countries. It advocated the restructuring of the international economic order to make it more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the developing world.

Pakistan attended the Non-aligned Summit as an observer in 1976 and formally became its member in September 1979. Earlier in March 1979, Pakistan withdrew from the CENTO.

Pak-India Relations: towards improvement

The most perplexing problem faced by Pakistan during this period related to the issues and problems arising out of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, resulting in the break up of East Pakistan and its establishment as an independent state. India and Pakistan signed a peace agreement at Simla on July 2, 1972 for dealing with the 1971 war related issues which included return of Pakistani Prisoner of War in Indian custody, Bangladesh’s threat to put 195 Pakistani POWs on war trials, withdrawal of Indian Pakistani troops on the West Pakistan-India border, recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan, and normalisation of Indo-Pakistan relations. These issues were tackled during 1972-76. Pakistan recognised Bangladesh in February 1974 on the eve of the 2nd Islamic Summit Conference held at Lahore. Bangladesh reciprocated by withdrawing its demand for war trials of 195 Pakistani POWs.

These developments produced a noticeable improvement in Pakistan-India relations. However they continued to view each other as major adversary. Pakistan was perturbed by India's policy of not relenting on military build-up and especially the detonation of a nuclear device in May 1974.

Strengthening of Ties with Major Powers

Pakistan's relations with the major powers continued to be based on bilateralism and mutuality of interests. The friendly ties that developed between Pakistan and China in the 60s were strengthened during this period. The top civil and military leaders visited each other quite frequently for consultation on bilateral relations and international and regional affairs. These meetings produced unanimity of views on most matters and China reiterated its support to Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity. A secure and independent Pakistan was the main feature of China's South Asia policy. Their interaction in cultural, scientific and technological fields also expanded and China made a significant contribution to Pakistan's economic and industrial (including defence industry) development. It was the main source of weapon procurement for Pakistan.

Pakistan succeeded in defusing antagonism that marked its relations with the Soviet Union against the backdrop of the Bangladesh crisis. The visits of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Moscow in 1972 and 1974 helped the two sides to understand each other's points-of-view on regional affairs, and they developed functional interaction, free from overt tension. Their bilateral trade and economic cooperation expanded during these years.

Pakistan's relations with China expanded rapidly. There were frequent high level exchanges between the two countries, including the visits of the heads of government and the top level officials of the ministries of foreign affairs and defence. China extended financial and technological assistance for setting up defence and civilian industry. Pakistan's relations with the U.S ranged from cordiality in the beginning to sharp differences on Pakistan's nuclear
programme towards the end of this phase. The U.S. reaffirmed support to Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity, and Z.A. Bhutto visited the U.S. in September 1973 and February 1975 which contributed to reinforcing their bilateral relations. The U.S. withdrew the arms embargo in stages: sale of non-lethal equipment and spare parts in 1973; and cash sale of weapons on case by case basis in 1975 - a decision welcomed by Pakistan.

Nuclear Technology and Relations with the U.S.
Sharp difference arose between Pakistan and the U.S. when, in 1976, Pakistan entered into an agreement with France to acquire a nuclear reprocessing plant. Viewing this as a move on Pakistan's part to acquire nuclear weapons capability, the U.S. worked towards blocking the deal and took several steps to make its displeasure on Pakistan's nuclear policy known to Pakistan: withdrawal of A-7 aircraft offer (1977), suspension of new economic assistance and military sales (1977-78), exclusion of Pakistan from President Carter's trip to Asia when he visited, inter alia, Iran and India (December 1977-January 1978). In 1978, the U.S. succeeded in convincing France to withdraw from the agreement for supplying a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan.

When the U.S. discovered that Pakistan was secretly working on setting up uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta, it suspended all economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan in April 1979. On top of this was the burning down of the U.S. embassy in Islamabad in November 1979 by a mob, consisting mainly of the students, which pushed Pakistan-U.S. relations to the lowest-ever point.

Pakistan and the Muslim World
Pakistan's relations with the Muslim states, particularly the states of the Middle East, touched new heights of cordiality and trust. These relations served Pakistan's diplomatic, economic and security needs in the post-1971 period. The states of the Middle East, especially the states of the Gulf region, extended economic assistance (investment, grants, and loans on soft terms) and diplomatic support to Pakistan. They accommodated Pakistani human-power, which brought a financial bonanza for Pakistan.
e. 1980-90: Afghanistan and Partnership with the United States

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 was an event of far-reaching geo-political ramifications. Pakistan viewed this development as a violation of independence and sovereignty of a neighbouring, non-aligned, and Muslim state by a superpower. As Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union were often marred by strains, it felt threatened by the idea of having to put up with a massive Soviet military presence in the neighbourhood, dreading direct military pressure or a more active Soviet support to the dissident elements in Baluchistan and NWFP.

Pakistan demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and supported the Afghan groups, described as Afghan Mujahideen, in their bid to dislodge the Soviets from Afghanistan. It allowed them to function from Pakistani territory and accommodated over 3 million Afghan refugees who poured into Pakistan within a year of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

Revival of Pakistan-U.S. Relations
The Afghanistan war proved a turning point in Pakistan-U.S. relations which moved from the lowest point of 1979 to close political, economic and security ties in the 1980s. The U.S. offered two packages of economic assistance and military sales to support Pakistan's role in the war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Some additional assistance was provided outside of these packages.

The first six-year assistance package (1981-87) amounted to US $ 3.2 billion, equally divided between economic assistance and military sales. The U.S. also sold 40 F-16 aircraft to Pakistan during 1983-87 at a cost of US $ 1.2 billion outside the assistance package. Pakistan paid this amount in cash partly from its resources and partly from the funds provided by friendly Arab states.

The second six-year assistance package (1987-93) amounted to US $ 4.2 billion. Out of this US $ 2.28 billion were allocated for economic assistance in the form of grants or loan that carried the interest rate of 2-3 per cent. The rest of the allocation (US $ 1.74 billion) was in the form of credit for military purchases. The new relationship with the U.S. increased its presence and influence in Pakistan and the latter developed close ties with the U.S. Central Command (Centcom) without formally joining it. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked together in passing on weapons, military training and financial support to Afghan resistance groups. They encouraged the volunteers from the Arab states to join the Afghan resistance in its struggle against the Soviet troops based in Afghanistan.

Despite a close Pakistan-U.S cooperation on Afghanistan, they diverged on Pakistan's nuclear programme, although the United States downplayed this issue and ignored Pakistan's stride in the nuclear field in order to keep Pakistan on board for the Afghan war.

Pakistan-China Relations
Pakistan-China relations maintained their steady march towards greater cordiality and a wide ranging cooperation in various fields. China extended full support to Pakistan in its interaction with India and endorsed Pakistan's position on the Afghanistan crisis. The barter trade through the Karakoram Highway expanded and China assisted Pakistan in agriculture, nuclear technology, power generation and heavy industry, especially the defence-related industry.

Pakistan and the OIC
Pakistan maintained cordial relations with the Muslim states which extended support at the bilateral level and through the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to Pakistan on the Afghanistan issue. Some of the Muslim countries donated cash and goods for helping the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. New agreements for expansion of trade, promotion of economic and technological cooperation, and establishment of joint economic commissions were signed with several Islamic countries.

A major problem faced by Pakistan in its relations with the Muslim world was that it got identified with conservative, monarchical and pro-U.S. regimes in the Middle East and its relations cooled off with radical and nationalist states like Libya, Syria and Iraq.

Pakistan-India: a policy of Dialogues
Pakistan-India relations were marked by the simultaneous pursuance of positive and negative interaction. There were periods of goodwill and relative harmony but these were short-lived. However, the redeeming feature of their diplomacy was that they never stopped talking on the
contentious issues. Whenever there was a downward slide a standoff in their relations, Pakistan or India took the initiative to revive the dialogue. There was more interaction between the two states in the 1980s than was the case in the past which kept their difference and problem within manageable limits. Two visits of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Pakistan in December 1988 for participation in the SAARC summit conference and an official visit in July 1989 resulted in considerable improvement in their relations but the goodwill generated by these visits did not last long.

The search for a negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan crisis proved a long drawn affair. The UN Secretary General’s representative initiated peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1982 in order to find a solution to the four interrelated aspects of the Afghanistan problem, viz, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, non-intervention and non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, international guarantees for non-intervention and non-interference, and the return of Afghan refugees to their homes in safety and honour. It was not until April 1988 that Pakistan and Afghanistan, along with the United States and the Soviet Union, signed four documents, popularly known as the Geneva Accords, which outlined the principles for the peaceful resolution of the Afghanistan problem.

The Soviets began withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan on the stipulated date, i.e. May 15, 1988, but the withdrawal did not proceed smoothly. The Afghan resistance groups attacked the withdrawing Soviet troops which caused an angry Soviet response, charging Pakistan with master-minding these attacks. The Soviet Union retaliated by stepping up air and ground attacks on Pakistani territory.

The completion of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989 removed a major irritant in Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, undertook his first-ever visit to Islamabad in February 1989 to explore the prospects of a new beginning in their relations. However, they continued to diverge in the subsequent years on the intra-Afghan strife and the return of Soviet POWs with the resistance groups.

Post-withdrawal Problems
The post-withdrawal problems, especially an intra-Afghan
f. 1990-2001: Post Cold War Era and Pakistan's Dilemmas

Four major issues dominated Pakistan's foreign policy in the 1990s. These were a drift in Pakistan-U.S. relations, the Afghanistan problem, the Kashmir insurgency and its impact on Indo-Pakistan relations, and the nuclear explosions.

Another Drift in Pak-US Relations

Pakistan faced hard choices in the early 1990s. The U.S. was no longer willing to underwrite Pakistan's economic development and modernisation of its military because Pakistan had lost its strategic relevance for the U.S.

The decline of Pakistan's strategic relevance was caused by a host of factors like the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1989), the revolt against the Soviet dominated authoritarian political systems in Eastern Europe (1989-90), the end of the Cold War (1990), and the break up of the Soviet Union (1991). The absence of a competing superpower secured the primacy of the U.S. in global politics and a triumph of western values of liberal democracy and free economy. Afghanistan was no longer a high priority issue and the U.S. attention focused on consolidation of the incipient democratic trends in Eastern Europe and Russia and management of local and regional irritants elsewhere.

This shifted U.S. priorities in South Asia from seeking Pakistan's cooperation to non-proliferation and repairing the damage caused to its relations with India due to its Pakistan-Afghanistan policies in the 1980s.

The United States imposed four types of sanctions against Pakistan in this phase. First, it suspended military sales and economic assistance to Pakistan by invoking the Pressler Amendment in October 1990 in pursuance of its non-proliferation policy. (See the above section). Second, additional economic sanctions were imposed on Pakistan after it exploded nuclear devices on May 28 and 30 1998 in response to similar explosions by India on May 11 and 13. Third, the US imposed more sanction after the military takeover in Pakistan on October 12, 1999 under a U.S. law that called for discontinuation of economic relations with the regimes that come to power by displacing an elected and constitutional government. The military regime led by General Pervez Musharraf was placed under these sanctions. Fourth, limited sanctions were applied to some Pakistani institutions and organisations in 2000, 2001 and 2003 on the pretext that Pakistan received missile technology from China or Korea in violation of the international arrangements for checking proliferation of missile technology.

The U.S. also toyed with the idea of declaring Pakistan as a terrorist state during the 1990s for allowing its territory to be used by militant Islamic groups, Afghan war veterans and others, for launching terrorist acts in Indian administered Kashmir and elsewhere. Pakistan's support to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (1996-2001) was another issue of contention between Pakistan and the U.S. The U.S. tried to mollify Pakistan by releasing weapons and military equipment Pakistan had paid for before the imposition of the Pressler Amendment and returned the money in 1996-97 Pakistan had paid for the purchase of new F-16 aircraft under a special legislation (the Brown Amendment). It is interesting to note that the U.S. returned the paid amount for F-16 aircraft after adjusting a part of the due amount against the price of the gain it supplied to Pakistan in the past and storage charges for the F-16 aircraft manufactured for Pakistan but not delivered to it.

Continuation of the Afghanistan Problem

The Afghanistan problem continued to haunt Pakistan during these years. It had two aspects: the refugee problem and installation of a government in Kabul that could ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan. Though the UN High Commissioner for Refugees launched various programmes for encouraging Afghan refugees to return to their homes, a majority of them stayed back. Internal strife in Afghanistan dissuaded them to go back; a good number of them returned after spending some time in Afghanistan or periodically shuttled between the two countries.

International assistance for the maintenance of refugees declined, increasing socio-economic pressures on Pakistan.

Pakistan's effort to install a pro-Pakistan Mujahideen government in Kabul did not succeed. When the Taliban movement surfaced in the fall of 1994 in Kandahar, the managers of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy co-opted them and facilitated their strides for capturing Kabul, which they did in the last week of September 1996. Pakistan recognised the Taliban government in May 1997 and secured its recognition from Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates. No other country extended recognition to the Taliban government.

It was not long that the Taliban government incurred the displeasure of the international community because of its socio-cultural and gender policies. They were also accused of harbouring militant Islamic groups that engaged in violence in different countries. The Al-Qaeda established its base in Afghanistan and some of the militant and sectarian Pakistan Islamic groups used Afghanistan as a safe-haven and military training centre. Despite the growing criticism of the Taliban government at the international level, Pakistan continued to support them and advocated that they should be given Afghanistan's seat in the UN, a plea that did not evoke much support. Pakistan made unsuccessful attempts in 2000-2001 to moderate Taliban's socio-cultural policies. It also sought the Taliban's help to round up the Pakistanis who took refuge in Afghanistan after resorting to violence and sectarian killings in Pakistan. The Taliban government denied their presence in Afghanistan which somewhat irritated the Pakistan government but it continued to support the Taliban government. The continued commitment to the Taliban regime in Kabul adversely affected Pakistan's reputation at the international level and built strains in its relations with Iran.

The civil strife in Afghanistan adversely affected Pakistan's efforts to cultivate meaningful economic and technological interactions with the states of Central Asia that attained independence when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Some of these states complained about the efforts of the Taliban and Pakistan based militant Islamic groups to cultivate linkages with the Islamic dissident element in Central Asian states.

Insurgency in Kashmir
The outbreak of insurgency in Indian administered Kashmir in 1989 added a new dimension to the Kashmir problem. By 1990-91, a number of ex-Afghan Islamic militant groups identified the situation in Kashmir as a Muslim cause and decided to support the insurgency. Pakistan's Army and intelligence authorities cultivated these groups and encouraged their role in Indian administered Kashmir as a low cost strategy to build pressure on India for the resolution of the Kashmir problem. As India was subjected to criticism at the international level for mismanaging the political affairs in Kashmir and there were complaints of human right violations by its security forces, India denied the domestic roots of insurgency in Kashmir and put the blame for the insurgency on the Pakistan-based militant Islamic groups. This built strains in India-Pakistan relations and the two countries traded charges and counter charges on the developments in Kashmir.

India and Pakistan agreed on a framework for peaceful interaction when Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Lahore in February 1999. However, the spirit of this declaration was destroyed when Pakistan and India engaged in a limited war in the Kargil region of Kashmir during May-July 1999. The Indian government felt betrayed by this war after having signed an agreement for peaceful interaction in February. When, in October 1999, Pakistan's Army Chief, General Pervez Musharraf, assumed power in a coup, Indian government refused to interact with his government. India pursued the policy of no contact with the military government of General Pervez Musharraf until July 2001 when Pervez Musharraf was invited by Vajpayee to visit Agra for talks. The Agra summit conference proved inconclusive.

Going Nuclear
The last major development in this phase was the decision of India and Pakistan to become overt nuclear powers. Had India not exploded nuclear devices on May 11 and 13, 1998, Pakistan would not have gone for nuclear explosions on May 28 and 30. These explosions were described by Pakistani leaders as the rectification of the strategic imbalance in the region caused by India's nuclear explosions.

Initially, there were signs that Pakistan might delay nuclear testing. The major factors that shaped Pakistan's decision to test nuclear devices included the reluctance of the Western powers to impose tough sanctions against India; non-availability of credible security guarantees to Pakistan; Pakistani perception that the U.S. administration would not be able to deliver an attractive package of economic assistance and military sales; the hawkish and anti-Pakistan statements of India's Union ministers and the senior members of the ruling party, creating the impression in Pakistan that India might use its nuclear status to extend its military reach beyond the Line of Control in Kashmir; and the growing domestic pressure for testing. The government of Pakistan did not make a realistic assessment of the implications of testing for Pakistan's troubled economy. Pakistan's economic crisis accentuated after nuclear
testing. However, the government deflected the criticism by describing it as a guarantee against India’s nuclear blackmail.

Pakistan describes its nuclear weapons and missile programmes as a part of its policy of maintaining ‘minimum credible deterrence’ against security threat from India. Given the wide imbalance in conventional weaponry to the advantage of India, Pakistan attaches much importance to nuclear and missile programmes for ensuring security. Pakistan has offered India a restraint regime covering nuclear and conventional weapons. India does not want to be tagged with Pakistan on this issue and favours a global restraint regime that takes care of its security concerns vis-à-vis China and fits well with its ambition for being counted as a leading global actor. As long as India and Pakistan diverge on how best to ensure their security, Pakistan will assign importance to its nuclear and missile programmes for ensuring its security.
g. 2001 Onwards: Counter Terrorism

September 11 and Fight Against Terrorism

The terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001 had such far reaching implications for the international system that one can talk of international politics in terms of before and after these terrorist attacks. The United States, other western countries, Russia and China decided to adopt effective measures for countering terrorism by non-state and transnational entities on the highest priority basis. Most other states supported this effort. The UN General Assembly condemned the terrorist attacks and called upon its members to join the global efforts for combating terrorism and not to allow their territories to be used for such activities.

The U.S. identified the Al-Qaeda movement of Osama bin Laden based in Afghanistan as the main culprit and declared its intentions to take punitive military measures against the Al-Qaeda movement and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which allowed Al-Qaeda to operate from Afghanistan. This focused attention on the policies of Pakistan for two reasons. First, Pakistan supported the Taliban regime in the past and its military and intelligence agencies had developed multifaceted interaction with the Taliban. Second, Pakistan shared a long border with Afghanistan and its support was important for any U.S. military operation in Afghanistan.

Given the devastation caused by the events of September 11 and sensing the mood of the international community, the government of Pakistan turned its back on the Taliban regime and joined the international community in its counter terrorism drive. Pakistan's decision was also influenced by the UN General Assembly resolutions which called upon its members to support the global efforts for combating terrorism. This was a decision against the backdrop of the international context in September 2001 which helped to protect Pakistan's major strategic interests of territorial security, protection of its nuclear and missile programmes, Kashmir, and revival of the economy.

Pakistan opened its airspace to U.S. aircraft for military operations in Afghanistan, and granted permission to the U.S. to use three small airports in Sindh and Baluchistan for logistical, communication and emergency support for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. The military and intelligence authorities of the two countries shared intelligence on terrorist groups and their activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. U.S. security and intelligence personnel have conducted joint operations in Pakistan with Pakistani security and intelligence agencies against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements that secretly entered Pakistan after being dislodged from Afghanistan. The U.S. military authorities and the Afghan government impressed on the Pakistani authorities to flush out the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements who take refuge in Pakistan's tribal areas after engaging in violent activities in Afghanistan. Pakistan dispatched its troops to the tribal areas in June 2003, which periodically launched operations against ex-Afghanistan militants in the tribal areas.

Increased U.S. Support

The U.S. reciprocated by withdrawing three categories of economic sanctions against Pakistan in October-November 2001 and took steps to revive bilateral relations in various fields of mutual interest, including the economy, trade and investment, socio-economic development and military modernisation and supply of weapons and military equipment.

Direct U.S. assistance to Pakistan has focused on fiscal support, technical and commodity assistance, enhanced trade, financial and technical support for several sectors like health, education, food, democracy promotion, child labour elimination, and counter-narcotics. The U.S. is extending economic and technological assistance to strengthen border security (mainly Pakistan-Afghanistan border), capacity building for dealing with law and order situation and especially terrorism, improvement of communication and road building in the tribal areas and greater record keeping and control of the people leaving or entering the country through different entry-exit points. The U.S. economic assistance during 2002-2003 included US $ 600 million as fiscal support and over US $ 455 million for different development programmes. Furthermore, Pakistan also received payment for the use of Pakistani facilities by American troops.

Pakistan also received liberal economic assistance from the World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank for various social development sectors, poverty reduction, and capacity building for different institutions of state. In December 2001, the Aid to Pakistan Consortium (the Paris Club) recommended to its members the rescheduling of Pakistan's debts amounting to US $ 12.5 billion, for a period
of 38 years, including a grace period of 15 years. The U.S. wrote off and rescheduled its debts. Pakistan received economic assistance, debt relief and trade concessions from Japan and the European Union. These measures eased the debt repayment pressure and gave Pakistan sufficient economic space to pursue policies to put its economic house in order.

The U.S. President made new offers of economic assistance during General Pervez Musharraf's visit to the U.S. in the last week of June 2003. He offered a five-year economic assistance package amounting to US $3 billion starting in 2004-05. It is equally divided between assistance for economic development and military sales.

The funds allocated for financial year 2003 and 2004 (outside of the promised assistance package) will be used to strengthen security arrangements, road construction and improvement of communication in the tribal areas. Funding would also be provided for setting up education and health facilities in these areas. A Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was signed as a step toward a free trade agreement. An accord was signed for cooperation in science and technology.

There is a widespread concern in Pakistan that, as in the past, the current phase of the reinvigorated Pakistan-U.S. relations might not continue for a long time. The U.S. would abandon Pakistan when its strategic interests shift away from in and around Pakistan. The U.S. Secretary of State, Collin Powell attempted to dispel these concerns during his visit to Islamabad on March 18, 2004 by announcing that the U.S. Administration would soon initiate the process for designating Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Speaking in Berlin on April 2, he said, “Pakistan is our strongest ally in the fight against terrorism and we want to build up and strengthen its institutions.” The status of a Major Non-NATO Ally is neither a formal security arrangement nor a commitment for supplying weapons. It underscores the importance of the relationship and the long term U.S. commitment for extending diplomatic support, economic and technological assistance, cooperation in other related fields and a sympathetic consideration of the request for weapons supply. (This does not mean that every request for weapons supply will be accepted by the U.S.) The two sides work together for achievement of the shared goals. A number of countries relevant to the U.S. security and economic interests were bestowed this status in the past.

The leading countries among these are Egypt, Kuwait, Japan, Philippines, South Korea and New Zealand.

Despite the U.S. decision to assign a priority to its relations with Pakistan, the troubled track record of their relations in the past would continue to cast doubts about the endurance of the current Pakistan-U.S. relations. The anti-U.S. rhetoric of many political parties in Pakistan, especially the Islamic parties known for the linkages with the Taliban and sympathies for Al-Qaeda, reinforces misgivings about the credibility of Pakistan-U.S. relations.

Détente with India

Pakistan’s relations with India witnessed ups and downs against the backdrop of the terrorist attacks in the U.S. in September 2001. India supported the U.S. war on terrorism but its leaders were unhappy that the U.S. had cultivated Pakistan for its counter terrorism strategy. The revived Pakistan-U.S. relations perturbed them. They maintained that Pakistan could not be a partner for counter terrorism because of what the Indian leaders described as Pakistan's deep involvement with the Taliban and its support to militant Islamic groups engaged in insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. They also demanded that the U.S. definition of terrorism must include the activities of the Pakistan-based Islamic groups in Kashmir. India insisted that the insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir was nothing but a product of infiltration of Pakistan based militant Islamic warriors.

India blamed Pakistan for the terrorist attacks on India’s Parliament on December 13, 2001. It massed its troops on the India-Pakistan border and threatened military action if Pakistan did not contain the activities of the militant Islamic groups operating in Kashmir. From January 1, 2002, India suspended all air and railroad traffic between the two countries, denied over-flight rights to Pakistani aircraft and downgraded diplomatic relations. Pakistan responded by mobilising its troops, and an eye-ball to eye-ball situation developed between the militaries of two countries. The tension reached the breaking point at the end of May 2002, but the diplomatic intervention of the U.S., the U.K., and the European Union averted the war.

India’s coercive diplomacy of massing its troops on the Pakistan border in a state of combat readiness did not lead to war mainly because of the threat of escalation of such a war into a nuclear conflict and the advice for restraint by
friendly countries.

India decided to withdraw its troops in October 2002. Pakistan announced a similar withdrawal of troops from the border area. However, India and Pakistan continued to trade charges and counter charges on a host of issues and Indian leadership insisted that it would not initiate a dialogue with Pakistan until Pakistan stopped “cross border terrorism” in Indian administered Kashmir. Pakistan offered unconditional dialogue on all contentious issue.

On April 18, 2003, Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, offered dialogue with Pakistan which was readily accepted by Pakistan. This led to the initiation of steps for normalisation of their bilateral relations but no step was taken to initiate a dialogue. In November, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, offered ceasefire on the Line of Control in Kashmir. India responded positively to this offer and a ceasefire was enforced on November 26. On December 18, Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf talked of flexibility in Pakistan's traditional policy on Kashmir by suggesting that Pakistan would be willing to go beyond the stated position and that he expected similar flexibility from India. He said "we are for UN resolutions [on Kashmir]. However, now we have left that aside. If we want to resolve this issue, both sides need to talk to each other with flexibility, coming beyond stated positions, meeting halfway somewhere ... We are prepared to rise to the occasion, India has to be flexible also."

The behind the scene diplomacy and the prompting by friendly countries made it possible for Mr. Vajpayee to visit Islamabad in the first week of January 2004 for participation in the SAARC summit conference. On the last day of the summit, January 6, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee issued a joint statement for initiation of bilateral dialogue on all contentious issues, including Kashmir. Pakistan committed that it would not allow its territory to be used for terrorist activities of any kind. This was a major breakthrough in Pakistan-India relations and speeded up the normalisation process.

The current goodwill between India and Pakistan can sustain if the dialogue between India and Pakistan facilitates the solution of the contentious issues. It can be argued that the current efforts to improve Indo-Pakistan relations are genuine but these efforts can reverse if the dialogue does not move in the direction of problem solving.

Pakistan's Relations with China and Russia
Pakistan's interaction with China expanded rapidly. The latter provided economic assistance and technological know-how for various economic development projects, including the Gavadar deep sea port. It also endorsed Pakistan's policy on combating terrorism and sought Pakistan's cooperation for containing dissident activity in the Xinjiang Muslim majority province.

Russian concern pertained to the reported linkages between the dissident elements in Chechnya and the militant Islamic groups based in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The arrest of Chechnya's activist from the Wana area in March 2004 confirmed that Russian concerns were not misplaced. Russia supported Pakistan's efforts to contain militant groups based in the areas adjacent to Afghanistan.

Muslim World and Pakistan
Pakistan maintained cordial interaction with the Muslim states, especially those located in the Gulf region. It supported the Palestinian cause and the two-state formula. The government of Pakistan floated the proposal for recognition of Israel, which had to be put aside due to strong domestic opposition.

Transfer of Nuclear Technology
Two major issues cropped up with reference to Pakistan's nuclear programme. First, much concern was expressed in 2001-2002 about the possibility of some militant Islamic group launching a terrorist attack on Pakistan's nuclear installations or getting hold of fissile or radioactive materials, which may be used for making a bomb. The government of Pakistan assured the international community that its nuclear installations had adequate security against a terrorist attack or nuclear theft. Second, it was discovered in 2003 that Pakistan's ace nuclear scientist transferred nuclear material from Pakistan to Iran, Libya and North Korea through a clandestine international network for material gains. The government de-linked itself from these transfers, claiming that the government was not involved in these activities. Pakistan's top leaders assured the international community that Pakistan strictly adhered to non-proliferation of nuclear materials, technical know-how and weapons.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The review of Pakistan's foreign policy shows that Pakistan's goals have remained more or less constant, although their scope was often redefined and new dimensions were added to them. The diplomatic and military strategies to pursue these goals varied over time. The changes in the strategies are understandable because a host of factors influence the foreign policy choices of a country, which include the dynamics of regional and international situation, the availability of human and material resources and the disposition and priorities of the policy makers. As these change over time, foreign policy must also change in its approach to bilateral, regional and global issues and problems.

Pakistan began with an independent foreign policy in 1947. However, it tilted towards the West in a period of 7 years due to serious economic and security pressures. It maintained a policy of close interaction in the security and economic fields with the West in general and the U.S. in particular in the mid and late 1950s, the 1980s, and now since September 2001. It pursued independent to non-aligned foreign policy from mid-60s to the end of the 1970s and assigned a great importance to its interaction with the Muslim states and the issues and problems of the developing world.

Pakistan is currently an active player in the global efforts for combating religious extremism and terrorism with a policy that extremism and terrorism pose serious threats to global security as well as to Pakistan's internal peace, stability and economic development. Pakistan has made some difficult decisions in pursuing counter terrorism and for ensuring peace and stability in the immediate neighbourhood in order to boost its image at the international level, restore international confidence in the ability of the Pakistani state and government to put their socio-economic house in order, and shape up as a democratically oriented, modern and enlightened Muslim polity that does not allow its territory to be used by extremist groups.


Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (New Delhi: Rupa, 1995).


